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Abstract. When the new research area of logic programming and non-monotonic
reasoning emerged at the end of the 1980s, it focused notably on the study of
mathematical relations between different non-monotonic formalisms, especially
between the semantics of stable models and various non-monotonic modal logics.
Given the many and varied embeddings of stable models into systems of modal
logic, the modal interpretation of logic programming connectives and rules be-
came the dominant view until well into the new century. Recently, modal inter-
pretations are once again receiving attention in the context of hybrid theories that
combine reasoning with non-monotonic rules and ontologies or external knowl-
edge bases.
In this talk I explain how familiar embeddings of stable models into modal log-
ics can be seen as special cases of two translations that are very well-known in
non-classical logic. They are, first, the translation used by Go¨del in 1933 to em-
bed Heyting’s intuitionistic logic H into a modal provability logic equivalent to
Lewis’s S4; second, the splitting translation, known since the mid-1970s, that al-
lows one to embed extensions of S4 into extensions of the non-reflexive logic,
K4. By composing the two translations one can obtain (Goldblatt, 1978) an ade-
quate provability interpretation of H within the Goedel-Loeb logic GL, the sys-
tem shown by Solovay (1976) to capture precisely the provability predicate of
Peano Arithmetic. These two translations and their composition not only apply
to monotonic logics extending H and S4, they also apply in several relevant cases
to non-monotonic logics built upon such extensions, including equilibrium logic,
non-monotonic S4F and autoepistemic logic. The embeddings obtained are not
merely faithful and modular, they are based on fully recursive translations appli-
cable to arbitrary logical formulas. Besides providing a uniform picture of some
older results in LPNMR, the translations yield a perspective from which some
new logics of belief emerge in a natural way.
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1 Introduction
When the new area of logic programming and non-monotonic reasoning emerged to-
wards the end of the 1980s much attention was paid the semantics of stable models and
its relation to systems of non-monotonic modal logic. Several different formal embed-
ding relations of stable model semantics into modal logics were discovered by Schwarz,
Gelfond, Lifschitz, Marek, Truszczynski, Chen and others. In this manner the modal-
epistemic interpretation of logic programming rules was born and became a dominant
view in the 1990s and even well into the new Century.
These embedding relations are interesting for several reasons. For one thing, it is
well-known that provability in formal systems can be given a modal interpretation and
so the new negation as failure-to-prove in logic programming might perhaps turn out
to be related in a natural way to modal concepts of this type. Secondly, logic programs
had a special kind of syntax based on rules, while their modal translations were sets of
ordinary logical formulas. So the embeddings seemingly related quite different kinds
of syntactic objects. Third, while the translations were not arbitrary (cf. provability
concepts of modality), they were largely ad hoc. That is to say, they were discovered and
found to work in a practical sense, but were not based on a single underlying, systematic
methodology. Indeed it seemed that as one moved from simpler to more complex types
of program rules, their modal translations actually changed. A comprehensive theory
to explain this was lacking. Moreover, while the successful embedding relations were
modular, they were generally defined on complete rules, one at a time, rather than being
built up recursively from the rule components.
The aim of this paper is to revisit the modal and epistemic interpretation of logic
programs under stable model semantics and try to supply an overarching theory that
links these different translations and explains in a certain sense why they work. What I
shall try to explain is how all of the familiar embeddings of stable models into modal
logics can be seen as special cases of two translations that are very well-known in
non-classical logic. They are, first, the translation used by Goedel in 1933 to embed
Heyting’s intuitionistic logic H into a modal provability logic equivalent to Lewis’s
S4; second, the splitting translation, known since the mid-1970s, that allows one to
embed extensions of S4 into extensions of the non-reflexive logic, wK4.
I hope this approach will be of historical as well as didactical interest. But it may
also prove useful beyond this. Recently, modal interpretations of logic programs are
once again receiving attention in the context of hybrid theories that combine reasoning
with non-monotonic rules and ontologies or external knowledge bases, often considered
in the framework of the so-called Semantic Web. It seems plausible that at least some of
these interpretations – since they involve translating answer set programs – will also be
closely related to the Goedel and the splitting translations. Another feature of interest
is that when we build up a picture of different logics, monotonic and non-monotonic,
related by these translations, we actually discover some gaps in the picture that can be
filled by ‘new’ logics that may be of interest in their own right. I will give an example
of this in due course.
1.1 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper will be organised around commutative diagrams of different log-
ics and their inter-relations. We’ll start with the basic case that was dealt with by Go¨del
and by Tarski and McKinsey: that of intuitionistic logic and modal S4. As we proceed
we will extend this diagram to include more logics, adding also the splitting trans-
lation. Eventually we will have a set of base logics, their extensions and also their
non-monotonic versions. Once this diagram is complete we will return to some of the
embeddings of stable model semantics that arose in the early years of logic program-
ming and non-monotonic reasoning. We’ll see how to derive those embeddings using
the two basic translations that we started with. We’ll conclude by discussing some pos-
sible extensions of this approach as well as some of its limitations.
2 Logical preliminaries
I shall assume familiarity with basic intuitionistic and modal propositional logic. What
follows is a brief summary that serves mainly to fix notation and terminology. For more
details the reader should consult the numerous introductions that can be found in hand-
book chapters and several textbooks, eg. Syntax. We consider propositional languages
equipped with an infinite set Prop of propositional letters. In both cases the symbols
∨,∧,¬,→ denote the propositional connectives disjunction, conjunction, negation and
implication, respectively.1 We consider normal modal logics containing the additional
necessity operator, 2. As usual 3ϕ denotes the proposition ¬2¬ϕ. The axioms are all
classical tautologies plus a selection of the axioms listed below. Rules of inference are:
modus ponens, substitution and necessitation.
K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
4 : 2p→ 22p
w4 : 2p ∧ p→ 22p
5 : ¬L¬Lp→ Lp
W5 : ¬L¬Lp→ (p→ Lp)
D : ¬Lp ∨ ¬L¬p
T : 2p→ p
F : (p ∧MLq)→ L(Mp ∨ q)
f : p ∧ ♦(q ∧2¬p)→ 2(q ∨ ♦q)
Well-known examples of modal logics we shall deal with are S4, containing the axioms
K,T and 4, the logic S5 which extends S4 by adding axiom 5, and KD45 comprising
precisely K,D, 4 and 5.
Intuitionistic propositional logic is determined by the usual intuitionistic axioms and
the rule modus ponens (see eg [8]). We denote this calculus by H for Heyting. Super-
intutionistic logics are obtained by adding further axioms to H. Here we consider one
1 Context should make it clear whether we are dealing with an intuitionistic connective or a
modal one.
such logic in particular, the logic of here-and-there, denoted by HT . This is obtained
by adding toH the axiom of Hosoi [?]:
α ∨ (¬β ∨ (α→ β))
HT is the strongest extension ofH that is properly contained in classical logic. It can be
equivalently presented as a 3-valued logic and is sometimes known as Go¨del’s 3-valued
logic.
Semantics. An (intuitionistic, Kripke) frame is a pair F = 〈W,≤〉, where W is a
non-empty set and ≤ a partial ordering on W . A Kripke modelM is a frame together
with a valuation V : Prop×W → {0, 1}. V is extended recursively to all formulas by
the usual truth conditions for intuitionistic Kripke semantics [8]. In particular we have
the following clause for implication
V (α→ β,w) = 1 iff V (β,w′) = 1 whenever V (α,w′) = 1, for all w′ ≥ w
(1)
Given a model M = 〈W,≤, V 〉 we also write M, w |= ϕ to denote V (ϕ,w) = 1.
Similarly, an intutionistic formula ϕ is said to be true in a modelM, denoted byM |=
ϕ, ifM, w |= ϕ for all w ∈ W (likewise for sets of formulas). A formula is valid on a
class of frames if it is true in all models based on those frames. Heyting’s calculusH is
sound and complete with respect to this semantics, in particular the theorems of H are
precisely the formulas valid on the class of all frames. For any super-intuitionistic logic
I based on some class K of frames, we can define a concept of (local) consequence as
follows. Σ |=I ϕ if for any modelM = 〈W,≤, V 〉 where 〈W,≤〉 is a frame in K, and
any point x ∈W ,M, x |= ϕ wheneverM, x |= Σ.
The logic HT is based on rooted frames having just two elements, h and t, with
h ≤ t. It is often convenient to represent an HT -model 〈{h, t},≤ V 〉 as an ordered
pair of sets of atoms, 〈H,T 〉, where H = {p ∈ Prop : V (p, h) = 1} and similarly
T = {p ∈ Prop : V (p, t) = 1}. By the usual persistence requirement it follows that
H ⊆ T . Truth, validity and consequence for HT are defined in the usual way.
Similarly a modal frame F = 〈W,R〉 comprises a set W together with a bi-
nary relation R on W . Again, modal models are frames equipped with a valuation
V : Prop×W → {0, 1}, where V is extended recursively to all formulas by the usual
truth conditions. In particular we have the standard condition for necessity:
V (Lϕ,w) = 1 iff V (ϕ,w′) = 1 for all w′ s.t. wRw′. (2)
For modal logics the notions of truth, validity and consequence are defined analogously
to the intuitionistic cases described above and we adopt similar notational conventions.
2.1 The Go¨del translation
In his 1933 paper Go¨del [9] provided an interpretation ofH into a logical system equiv-
alent to S4. His original translation of intuitionistic into modal formulas, denoted here
by τ , is defined as follows:
τ(p) = Lp
τ(ϕ ∧ ψ) = τ(ϕ) ∧ τ(ψ)
τ(ϕ ∨ ψ) = τ(ϕ) ∨ τ(ψ)
τ(ϕ→ ψ) = L(τ(ϕ)→ τ(ψ)
τ(¬ϕ) = L¬τ(ϕ)
If we add τ(⊥) = ⊥, then the translation of ¬ϕ becomes derivable via the definition
¬ϕ := ϕ → ⊥. Go¨del also noted that variations on this translation will also work; a
frequently used variant is the translation that places an ‘L’ before every subformula.2
Go¨del essentially established that for an intuitionistic formula ϕ,
`H ϕ⇒ `S4 τ(ϕ), (3)
(where ` with subscripts denotes theoremhood) and he conjectured that the converse
relation also holds, in other words that τ is a faithful interpretation or embedding. This
conjecture was later proved by McKinsey and Tarski in their 1948 paper [36].
Following [16], McKinsey and Tarski [34–36] also laid the foundations for the alge-
braic and topological study of intuitionistic and modal logics. The basic idea, recalled
and developed in a recent paper by Leo Esakia [7], is that from an arbitrary topological
space X we can generate three different algebraic structures each giving rise to differ-
ent logical systems.3 In particular, by considering the algebra of open sets, Op(X), one
is led to the well-known Heyting algebra that also forms a semantical basis for intu-
itionistic logic. On the other hand by considering the closure algebra, (P(X), c) one
is led to the modal system S4.4 In [36] McKinsey and Tarski proved the topological
completeness of S4 where 3 is interpreted as the closure operator c.
By the 1970s logicians began the systematic study of relations between (the lat-
tice of) extensions of H and (the lattice of) normal extensions of S4. Also, since (as
Go¨del [9] already observed) S4-necessity does not correspond to provability in a for-
mal system, interest grew in finding modal systems that directly model provability con-
cepts. Around 1976 Esakia introduced the expression “modal companion” of a super-
intuitonistic logic I to refer to those modal systems into which I can be embedded via
the Go¨del translation.5 He also established in [5, 6] that H has a strongest modal com-
panion, the so-called Grzegorczyk logic, Grz, already known to be a modal companion
ofH, [10]. Grz is the extension of S4 obtained by adding the schema
L(L(p→ Lp)→ p)→ p.
2 The version of the Go¨del translation given here by τ is actually the one used by McKinsey and
Tarski [36] and is commonly found in the literature.
3 For the basic notions of topology see eg [12] or any appropriate textbook.
4 Recall that a Heyting algebra (H,∨,∧,→,⊥) is a distributive lattice with smallest element
⊥ containing a binary operation → such that x ≤ a → b iff a ∧ x ≤ b. (B,∨,∧,−, c) is
a closure algebra if (B,∨,∧,−) is a Boolean algebra and c is a closure operator satisfying:
a ≤ ca, cca = ca, c(a ∨ b) = ca ∨ cb, c⊥ = ⊥.
5 The expression is translated from the Russian ????????? ???????? .
Esakia’s result is part of a more general pattern: the Blok-Esakia Theorem [1, 5] estab-
lishes an isomorphism between the lattice of intermediate logics and the lattice of all
normal extensions of Grz.
2.2 The splitting translation
In the same year, 1976, Solovay [40] proved the arithmetical completeness of the so-
called Go¨del-Lo¨b modal logic, GL, establishing a correspondence between derivability
in GL and provability in the formal system of Peano Arithmetic, PA. GL results from
K4 by adding the schema
L(Lp→ p)→ Lp.
At this point it is appropriate to turn to the splitting translation that will be denoted
here by a superscript operator ‘+’. This is a translation from modal formulas to modal
formulas that replaces each occurrence of L by L+ where L+ϕ abbreviates
ϕ ∧ Lϕ,
other formulas being left unchanged. It appears that the splitting translation was in-
dependently discovered by several authors and its first main application is usually at-
tributed to Kuznetsov and Muravitsky [29], Goldblatt [26] and Boolos [2]. They estab-
lished the following embedding of the reflexive logic Grz into the non-reflexive GL.
`Grz p⇔ `GL p+. (4)
Not surprisingly, as Goldblatt [26] showed, one can form the composition τ+ of τ with
+ and combine (3) and (4) to yield
`H p⇔ `GL τ+(p), (5)
(setting τ+(p) = (τ(p))+) which using Solovay’s result yields a provability interpreta-
tion of intuitionistic logic.
If we depict these relations in diagrammatic form, from the simple picture
H τ // S4
we have now reached the following situation
Grz
+ // GL
H
τ
<<zzzzzzzz
τ // S4
OO
The splitting translation has two very natural interpretations. One of them is topo-
logical. A third path from topology to logic is via what are known as derivative alge-
bras, (P(X), der). These are Boolean algebras with a unary operation der representing
topological derivation: if A is a subset of X then der(A) is the set of all accumulation
or limit points of A. Under this topological reading of modal logics Mp is interpreted
as derivation. Since in topology closure is definable in terms of derivation, viz. for a
point set A, c(A) = A ∪ der(A), we obtain the following modal connection: Mp is
identified with p ∨Mp. But this is precisely the splitting translation when applied to
M , namely M+p = p ∨Mp.
In [37] Esakia showed that the derivative algebra (P (X), der) gives rise to the
modal logic wK4, a slightly weaker version of the logicK4, that was first studied from
a topological point of view in [4] (see [7] for a detailed overview). wK4 is obtained
by adding the axiom schema w4 to K. It is known to be the weakest normal extension
of K into which S4 embeds via the splitting translation. This means that we can now
complete our previous picture by adding in a missing logic, namely the logic of all
topological spaces interpreting M as the derivative operator:6
Grz
+ // GL
H
τ
<<zzzzzzzz
τ // S4
OO
+ // wK4
OO
The logics on the right of our picture are interesting from another perspective as
well. While extensions of S4 may be considered good candidates for modelling epis-
temic reasoning about knowledge, extension of wK4 are candidates to form logics of
belief. In particular they may not have the strong T axiom Lp → p. A standard dox-
astic logic, KD45, is one such extension of wK4. From this epistemic perspective the
splitting translation is also very natural. Interpreting Lp in extensions of S4 as “the
agent knows p” and in extensions of wK4 as “the agent believes p”, then knowledge is
interpreted via the splitting translation as ‘truth plus belief’.
3 Monotonic embeddings
Up to this point we have remarked how the systems H, S4 and wK4 represent three
distinct paths to logic via topology, each logic captured in its own way by the class of
all topological spaces. We also saw how the Go¨del translation τ embedsH into S4 and
how wK4 is the least logic into which S4 embeds via the splitting translation, +.
Let us now turn to logics obtained from minimal topological spaces. A topological
space is minimal if it has only three open sets. Considering the algebra of open sets
we arrive at the 3-element Heyting algebra which captures precisely the logic HT of
here-and-there. Taking as a starting point the closure algebra (P(X), c) we obtain the
modal logic S4F that adds the F axiom schema to S4. The semantics of S4F was first
studied by Segerberg [15]. However in [18, 19] Schwarz and Truszczynski proposed a
new approach to minimal knowledge and suggested that this concept is precisely cap-
tured by non-monotonic S4F . In [19] it was shown that non-monotonic S4F captures,
under some intuitive encodings, several important approaches to knowledge represen-
tation. They include disjunctive logic programming under answer set semantics [?],
6 Vertical arrows always denote extensions.
(disjunctive) default logic [23], [25], the logic of grounded knowledge [27], the logic of
minimal belief and negation as failure [28] and the logic of minimal knowledge and be-
lief [19]. Recently, Truszczynski [31] and Cabalar [32] have revived the study of S4F
in the context of a general approach to default reasoning.
Frames for S4F have the form depicted in Figure 1 where W1 and W2 are clusters,
W2
W1first floor
second floor
Fig. 1.
all points are reflexive and every point in W2 is accessible from every point in W1. We
call W1,W2 respectively the first and the second floor of the model. The former may be
empty but the latter not. In these frames the acessibility relation is of course a preorder
or quasi-order.
If the possibility operator ‘M ’ is construed as topological derivation then, as Pearce
and Uridia [38] recently showed, as the logic corresponding to the class of minimal
topological spaces one obtainswK4f , the system extendingwK4 by adding the schema
f . [38] also establishes soundness and completeness of wK4f with respect to a class
of modal frames.The frames for wK4f are similar to those of S4F except that we drop
W2
W1
i2 r2
i1 r1first floor
second floor
Fig. 2.
the condition of reflexivity on frames: in Fig. 2 some points in W1,W2 may now be
irreflexive (where i and r label this difference). Accessibility for these frames is only
weakly-transitive [38].
Therefore by considering logics extendingH , S4 and wK4 based on minimal topo-
logical spaces, we obtain respectively the systemsHT , S4F and wK4f . So our picture
now looks like this:
min− topologies HT S4F wK4f
topologies H
OO
τ // S4
OO
+ // wK4
OO
Our main objective is to consider non-monotonic versions of the logics HT , S4F and
wK4f and to show how the first of these, equilibrium logic, in the diagram below EL,
embeds into the other two. In diagrammatic form we want to show
nonmonotonic EL
τ // S4F ∗
+ // wK4f∗
where the starred version of a modal logic indicates its non-monotonic version. Rather
than attempt to do this directly, we will build on the embedding relations that hold at
the monotonic level and then show how these can be lifted to the non-monotonic cases.
So we will deal with this picture:
nonmonotonic EL
τ // S4F ∗
+ // wK4f∗
min− topologies HT
OO
τ // S4F
OO
+ // wK4f
OO
Actually the embeddings at the bottom of this picture can be established by standard
methods. But since these are quite general and applicable to many logics, it may be a
useful exercise to review them here. We’ll omit detailed proofs but give the main ideas
and lemmas needed.
Let F = 〈W,R〉 be a modal frame. We define the reflexivization of F to be the
frame Fr = 〈W,Rr〉 where
xRry iff x = y or xRy. (6)
It is easy to see that if F is a one-step, weakly transitive frame for wK4f then Fr
is transitive and a frame for S4F . Given a model M = (F , V ), Mr is the model
(Fr, V ).7
Lemma 1. For every modelM, every point x inM and every formula ϕ,
M, x |= ϕ+ iff Mr |= ϕ.
The proof is by induction on ϕ. From this “reflexivization” lemma we can deduce that
for every frame F and formula ϕ,
F |= ϕ+ iff Fr |= ϕ. (7)
7 The following few steps and results seem to be standard and quite well-known in modal logic,
so I am not sure how to give precise references. However, I learnt the method from Misha Za-
kharyaschev who several years ago supplied me with a detailed account and proofs. Moreover
a good reference for this topic is the paper by Chagrov and Zakharyachev.
On this basis we can relate the frames for wK4f to those for S4F . Now consider
the Goedel translation, τ . Corresponding to this there is a semantic map that relates
quasi-ordered modal frames to partially order intuitionistic frames. We denote this map
by ρ and define it as follows. Let F be a quasi-ordered frame and M = 〈F , V 〉 a
model based on it. The skeleton ρF of F is obtained from F by collapsing clusters to
single points, resulting in a partially-ordered frame. The corresponding model ρM =
〈ρF , ρV 〉, called the skeleton ofM, is defined by the intuitionistic valuation ρV which
for each variable p, sets
ρV (p) = {C(x) :M, x |= 2p}, (8)
where C(x) is the cluster generated by x, ie it is a single point of ρF .
The following “skeleton lemma” is another well-known result that is proved by
induction on formulas ϕ.
Lemma 2. LetM be a modal model based on a quasi-ordered frame. Then for every
point x inM and every intuitionistic formula ϕ,
ρM, C(x) |= ϕ iff M, x |= τ(ϕ).
Likewise we can deduce that for every quasi-ordered frameF and intuitionistic formula
ϕ we have
ρF |= ϕ iff F |= τ(ϕ). (9)
We define the translation τ+ by setting τ+(ϕ) = (τ(ϕ))+. Then our embedding theo-
rem can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. The translation τ+ is an embedding of HT into wK4f , ie for any intu-
tionistic formula ϕ,
|=HT ϕ iff |=wK4f τ+(ϕ).
Proof. Suppose that 6|=wK4f τ+(ϕ). Then there is a wK4f frame F such that F 6|=
τ+(ϕ). Hence Fr 6|= τ(ϕ) and so ρ(Fr) 6|= ϕ. However ρ(Fr) is isomorphic to the
HT -frame H, meaning that 6|=HT ϕ. For the other direction, if 6|=HT ϕ then H 6|= ϕ.
Hence Fr 6|= τ(ϕ) and so F 6|= τ+(ϕ). 2
Evidently we can decompose τ+ to deduce that τ embeds HT into S4F and +
embeds S4F into wK4f .
4 Non-monotonic embeddings
Now we turn to the non-monotonic versions of these logics. For the case of a normal
modal logic S the standard way to define its non-monotonic version that we’ll denote
by S∗ is via a fixpoint condition that defines the so-called S-expansions.
Definition 1. Let S be a normal modal logic with consequence relation CnS . Let I be
a set of modal formulas. A set of formulas E is said to be an S-expansion of I iff
E = CnS(I ∪ {¬2ϕ : ϕ 6∈ E}).
Then S∗ is the non-monotonic logic determined by truth in all S-expansions, ie. we
can define the non-monotonic entailment relation by I |∼S∗ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ E for each S-
expansion E of I .
Similarly, the logic HT has a natural non-monotonic extension that we call equilib-
rium logic, EL. This can also be captured by a similar fixpoint condition.
Definition 2. Let X be a set of intuitionistic formulas. A set of formulas C is said to be
a completion of X iff
C = CnHT (X ∪ {¬ϕ : ϕ 6∈ C}).
Again equilibrium logic is determined by truth in all completions.
For proving results about these logics it is often easier to work with equivalent
characterisations using minimal or preferred models. For the case of EL this was the
original definition of the logic in terms of special kinds of minimal HT -models called
equilibrium models.
Definition 3. Among HT-models we define the order  by: 〈H,T 〉 〈H ′, T ′〉 if T =
T ′ and H ⊆ H ′. If the subset relation is strict, we write ‘’.
Definition 4. Let X be a set of intuitionistic formulas andM = 〈H,T 〉 a model of X .
M is said to be an equilibrium model of X if it is minimal under  among models of
X , and it is total.
Equilibrium models of theories correspond to their completions, so we can define infer-
ence by
X |∼ ϕ iff M |= ϕ for each equilibrium model M of X. (10)
Certain kinds of non-monotonic modal logics are captured by a concept of minimal
model that was introduced by Schwarz [39].
Definition 5. Let N = (N,S, U) be a two-floor S4F model as depicted in Figure 1.
We say that N is preferred over an S5-modelM = (W,R, V ) if:
a) There is a propositional formula ψ such thatM  ψ and N 1 ψ,
b) (W,R) is the second floor of (N,S) and V equals to the restriction of U to the
second floor. Briefly,M is the model which is obtained by deleting the first floor in N .
From this one obtains the notion of minimal model that is central for the semantics of
non-monotonic modal logics.
Definition 6. An S5-modelM = (W,R, V ) is called a K-minimal model for the set of
formulas I ifM  I and for every preferred model N ∈ K we have N 1 I .
Schwarz showed that for logics S such as S4F that are cluster-closed, minimal
models correspond to S-expansions and so characterise the logic. For the case ofwK4f
we cannot directly apply Schwarz’s Theorem since the class K which characterises
wK4f is not cluster-closed. In particular some two-floor models in K may not have a
cluster as a maximum. On the other hand every model inK has a maximal weak-cluster
(that is a cluster where irreflexive points are allowed or more precisely it is a rooted,
symmetric, weakly-transitive frame).
It turns out that Schwarz’s Theorem can be extended to the weak-cluster closed class
K, so accordingly we extend Definitions 5 and 6 to include this class. We then obtain
the following recent result from [38].
Theorem 2. LetM = (W,R, V ) be an S5-model, and T = {ϕ :M  ϕ}. Then T is
an wK4f -expansion of I if and only ifM is a K-minimal model of I .
We are now ready to prove that τ+ embeds equilibrium logic into non-monotonic
wK4f . Although we could prove this in one step, it is more convenient to deal with
the τ and the + embeddings separately and then compose them at the end. So, first let’s
show how the relexivization map r preserves the property of being a minimal model.
Lemma 3. Let I be a set of modal formulas. M is a minimal wK4f -model of I+ if
and only ifMr is a minimal S4F -model of I .
Proof. For the ‘if’ direction suppose that r is the mapping from wK4f models to S4F
models that makes irreflexive points reflexive. Let I be a theory in S4F and consider
any minimal modelM of I+. SinceM is an S5-model,Mr =M. Suppose it is not a
minimal model of I . Then there is a preferred modelM′ < Mr such thatM′ |= I but
there is a propositional formula α such thatMr verifies α butM′ does not. In particular
M′ is a 2-floor model that we can represent as the pair (N ,Mr), where N is the first-
floor cluster. Now consider (N ,M) as a wK4f model. Evidently (N ,M)r =M′. So,
by the reflexivization lemma, for any formula ϕ,
M′ |= ϕ iff (N ,M)r |= ϕ iff (N ,M) |= ϕ+.
Now since α is an (objective), propositional formula, α+ = α and so (N ,M) 6|= α+.
On the other hand, (N ,M) |= I+. But this contradicts the assumption that M is a
minimal model of I+. It follows thatMr is a minimal model of I .
For the ‘only if’ direction the argument is quite similar, applying the Reflexivization
Lemma. It is left to the reader. 2
We have established one half of the embedding. Now let us turn to the semantic
mapping between S4F -models and HT models and show that it preserves the property
of being a minimal model.
Lemma 4. Let X be a set of HT -formulas.M is a minimal model of τ(X) if and only
if ρM is an equilibrium model of X .
Proof. For the ‘if’ direction, suppose thatM is a minimal model of τ(X). Recall thatM
is an S5-model and ρV (p) = {C(x) :M, x |= 2p}. Now suppose for the contradiction
that ρMr is not an equilibrium model of X . Then there is an HT -model N of X such
thatN  ρM. The means that for some propositional variable p we haveN , t |= p and
N , h 6|= p. Suppose N has the form N = 〈ρF ′, U〉 where F ′ = 〈W,R〉 is an S4F
frame. By setting for each p
V ′(p) = {x ∈W : N , C(x) |= p}
one obtains a modal (S4F ) model 〈F ′, V ′〉 whose skeleton is (isomorphic to) N . By
construction 〈F ′, V ′〉 has two clusters. Its second floor is equivalent toM and verifies
2p and hence p, while its first floor does not verify p. It follows that 〈F ′, V ′〉 is preferred
overM. Now sinceM is a minimal model of τ(X), 〈F ′, V ′〉 6|= τ(X). But applying
the skeleton Lemma we have for any ϕ,
〈F ′, V ′〉 |= τ(ϕ) iff ρ〈F ′, V ′〉 |= ϕ iff N |= ϕ.
This shows that N 6|= X contradicting our assumption.
The ‘only if’ direction is similar and left to the reader. 2
Theorem 3. τ+ is an embedding of equilibrium logic into non-monotonic wK4f . In
particular we have for any set X of HT -formulas, and formula ϕ
X |∼ ϕ iff τ(X) |∼S4F∗ τ(ϕ) iff τ+(X) |∼wK4f∗ τ+(ϕ).
Proof. Apply Lemmas 3 and 4 together with Theorem 2. 2
To complete our picture of modal embeddings, let us turn to two well-known strength-
enings of S4F and wK4f respectively. SW5 is the extension of S4F whose frames
consist of a single reflexive point that sees a cluster (in Fig. 1, W1 becomes a single
point). Likewise KD45 is captured by frames that comprise a single irreflexive point
that sees a cluster (in Fig. 2, W1 becomes an irreflexive point while W2 now contains
only reflexive points). The non-monotonic version of KD45 is well-known as being
(equivalent to) autoepistemic logic. Since the frames for SW5 are similar, but reflex-
ive, its non-monotonic version, SW5∗ has been called reflexive autoepistemic logic,
[14].
It is easy to see that our previous embeddings also hold for SW5 and KD45 to-
gether with their autoepistemic extensions (notice that these logics fall under the scope
of Schwarzs theorem and so they can be characterised in terms of minimal models). The
proofs are entirely analogous. Without stating these properties as theorems, we merely
present them as the picture in Fig. 3.
EL
τ // SW5∗
+ // KD45∗
HT
OO
τ // SW5
OO
+ // KD45
OO
Fig. 3.
The close relation between autoepistemic and reflexive autoepistemic logic was al-
ready studied in [?].
5 Deriving embeddings for logic programs
Our next task is to examine some of the familar embeddings of of logic programs un-
der stable model and answer set semantics to nonmonotonic modal logics. We consider
some of the most general ones here and show how to derive them from our main theo-
rem.
Even before the birth of the stable model semantics for logic programs in [21] efforts
were made to connect negation as failure with modal logic. Early steps were taken by
Gabbay [24] and Gelfond [20].8 Gabbay used the provability logic GL (and a specially
adapted extension) to interpret negation as failure, while Gelfond provided a connec-
tion between SLDNF-resolution for stratified programs and provability in autoepistemic
logic, a similar connection being maintained for arbitrary normal programs under the
stable model semantics developed with Lifschitz around the same time [21].
The concept of stable model or answer set was soon extended to embrace more gen-
eral kinds of logic programs, containing disjunctive rules and a second, strong nega-
tion operator, though it was not immediately apparent how these extensions could be
related to non-monotonic modal systems [22]. Answers were provided at the 2nd Inter-
national LPNMR workshop held in Lisbon in June 1993. No fewer than three papers by
five authors proposed similar embeddings of answer set semantics into autoepistemic
logic [14, 13, 3], while two of these papers also dealt with the relation to non-monotonic
SW5, alias “reflexive” autoepistemic logic [14, 13].
5.1 Answer sets and SW5 expansions
The main results of [14, 13] concern disjunctive logic programs. They consist of rules
α, that, if written as logical formulas, have the shape
p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬pm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬pn → q1 ∨ . . . ∨ qk (11)
where the pi and qj are atoms.9 To establish modal embeddings they consider the fol-
lowing translation of a rule α of form (11), which we denote by σ(α):
Lp1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lpm ∧ L¬Lpm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ L¬Lpn → Lq1 ∨ . . . ∨ Lqk (12)
A disjunctive logic program is a set of such rules and if Π is a disjunctive program let
σ(Π) := {σ(α) : α ∈ Π}. The results of [13] and [14] are quite similar but they are
presented and proved somewhat differently. [13] uses the bi-modal system of minimal
belief and negation-as-failure (as does [3]) while in [14] Marek and Truszczyn´ski use
the method of preferred models. We state the main property using their formulation.
Proposition 1 ([14, 13]). Let Π be a logic program and T a set of atoms. Then T is an
answer set for Π if and only if ST (T ) is an SW5-expansion of σ(Π).
If X is a set of non-modal formulas, ST (X) stands for the unique stable theory E
whose non-modal part is precisely Cn(X), the classical propositional consequences of
X .
It is well-known that equilibrium logic generalises stable model semantics to the
full language of propositional logic. In particular, for any kind of logic program Π , a
8 Gabbay’s paper from 1991 was circulated in draft form from the mid-80s.
9 They also include the case where the pi, qj can be atoms or their strong negations but let us
postpone the topic of strong negation to a later section.
set T of atoms is a stable model of Π if and only if there is an equilibrium modelM of
Π (writing rules of Π as logical formulas) such that for any atom p, p ∈ T iffM |= p.
If we represent HT -models as pairs 〈H,T 〉 where H is the set if atoms verified ‘here’
and T is the set of atoms verified ‘there’, then T is an answer set of Π iff 〈T, T 〉 is an
equilibrium model of Π . It follows that all embeddings of equilibrium logic include as
a special case corresponding embeddings of logic programs under stable models.
To derive Proposition 1, it suffices to note that equilibrium models and answer sets
coincide and to show that the embedding σ is closely related to to τ .
Proposition 2. For any program rule α of form (11), in SW5, τ(α) ≡ Lσ(α).
Proof. Let α be of form (11). Then by inspection τ(α) is the formula
L(Lp1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lpm ∧ L¬Lpm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ L¬Lpn → Lq1 ∨ . . . ∨ Lqk) (13)
which is exactly Lσ(α). 2
Since answer sets correspond to equilibrium models, the embedding depicted in Fig.
3 establishes the relation between answer sets of a disjunctive program Π and the re-
flexive autoepistemic expansions of Lσ(Π), where for any set of formulas Γ , we put
LΓ = {Lϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. Although in extensions of S4, τ(Π) and σ(Π) are not gener-
ally equivalent, for non-monotonic SW5 there is no difference. In particular it is easy
to see that these sets of formulas have the same SW5-expansions. Recall that SW5-
expansions are also called reflexive autoepistemic expansions because they satisfy the
following condition [13, 14]: E is an SW5-expansion of I if and only if
E = Cn(I ∪ {ϕ↔ Lϕ : ϕ ∈ E} ∪ {¬Lϕ : ϕ 6∈ E}) (14)
where Cn is ordinary consequence in classical propositional logic.
Lemma 5. For any set Γ , LΓ and Γ have the same SW5-expansions.
Proof. For any set T ⊇ I , it is evident that Cn(I ∪ {ϕ↔ Lϕ : ϕ ∈ T}) and Cn(LI ∪
{ϕ↔ Lϕ : ϕ ∈ T}) are the same.
To derive Proposition 1 one may use the following simple lemma.
Lemma 6. LetM be a minimal SW5-model and ϕ a modal-free formula. ThenM |=
ϕ if and only ifM |= τ(ϕ).
This can be shown by induction on ϕ. Now notice that if T is an answer set of Π and
hence 〈T, T 〉 is an equilibrium model, then the formulas true in 〈T, T 〉 are precisely
the classical consequences Cn(T ) of T . Now we apply Lemmas 4 and 6. Then M
is a minimal model of τ(Π) if and only if ρ(M) is an equilibrium model of Π , and
ρ(M) |= ϕ iffM |= τ(ϕ) iffM |= ϕ, for modal-free ϕ. Since the stable expansion is
given by the formulas true in the minimal model, we have established that the modal-
free formulas true in the stable expansion are precisely those in Cn(T ), where 〈T, T 〉
is ρ(M) and T is an answer set of Π . So T is answer set for Π if and only if ST (T )
is an SW5-expansion of τ(Π). Proposition 1 then follows by Lemma 5 and Proposition
2.
5.2 Autoepistemic logic
There have been several embeddings of stable model semantics into autoepistemic
logic. For the case of disjunctive logic programs with rules of shape (11), the following
translation Tr was used by [13, 14]: for α of the form (11), Tr(α) is the expression:
(p1∧Lp1)∧ . . .∧(pm∧Lpm)∧¬Lpm+1∧ . . .∧¬Lpn → (q1∧Lq1)∨ . . .∨(qk∧Lqk)
(15)
The result obtained by [13, 14] can be stated thus:
Theorem 4 ([13, 14]). Let Π be a logic program. A set of atoms T is a stable model of
Π if and only if ST (T ) is an autoepistemic expansion of Tr(Π).
Proof. It suffices to show that Tr(α) is equivalent to τ+(α). From the previous case it
is clear that we can simplify τ(α) to the expression (13). Applying the + translation to
this we obtain the following form for τ+(α):
(p1 ∧ Lp1) ∧ . . . ∧ (pm ∧ Lpm) ∧ (¬(pm+1 ∧ Lpm+1) ∧ L(¬(pm+1 ∧ Lpm+1)))
∧ . . . ∧ (¬(pn ∧ Lpn) ∧ L(¬(pn ∧ Lpn)))→ (q1 ∧ Lq1) ∨ . . . ∨ (qk ∧ Lqk)
This can be simplified, in particular by noting that in KD45 the equivalence
¬Lϕ ≡ L(¬(ϕ ∧ Lϕ))
holds. Substituting for the RHS of this equivalence, the middle terms of τ+(α) become
¬(pm+1 ∧ Lpm+1) ∧ ¬Lpm+1
etc, which by propositional logic is equivalent to ¬Lpm+1. So τ+(α) becomes
(p1∧Lp1)∧ . . .∧(pm∧Lpm)∧¬Lpm+1∧ . . .∧¬Lpn → (q1∧Lq1)∨ . . .∨(qk∧Lqk)
(16)
as required.
6 Draft end here - to be completed
In the mid-1980s efforts were made to understand negation-as-failure in logic program-
ming in terms of provability in modal logics (Gabbay, ca. 1985, Gelfond, 1987). The
second of these works was based on the non-monotonic system of autoepistemic logic
and led a short time later to the discovery of stable model semantics that subsequently
formed the basis for answer set programming. With stable model semantics, the new
area of logic programming and non-monotonic reasoning quickly emerged, its first in-
ternational workshop being held in 1991. A feature of the emergent area was the study
of the mathematical relations between different non-monotonic formalisms, especially
between the semantics of stable models and various non-monotonic modal logics. Given
the embeddings provided by Schwarz, Gelfond, Lifschitz, Marek and Truszczynski,
Chen and others into systems of modal logic, the modal interpretation of logic pro-
gramming rules became the dominant view for most of the 1990s.
The translation used by Goedel in 1933 to embed Heyting’s intuitionistic logic into
a modal provability logic equivalent to Lewis’s S4 The splitting translation, known
since the mid-1970s, allows one to embed extensions of S4 into extensions of the non-
reflexive logic, K4. A famous early result of this kind is the embedding by Kuznetsov
and Muravitsky (1976) of the Grzegorczyk logic Grz into the Goedel-Loeb provability
logic GL. By composing the two translations one can obtain (Goldblatt, 1978) an ade-
quate provability interpretation of Heyting’s calculus within GL, the logic that Solovay
(1976) showed to capture precisely the provability predicate of Peano arithmetic.
In this paper we explore an approach to minimal belief that borrows the basic ideas
of minimal knowledge studied by Schwarz and Truszczynski [18, 19]. At the same time
we show how the logics underlying minimal knowledge and belief are related to min-
imal topologies using the well-known methods for obtaining logics from topologies
described by [34] and [7]. We start with a brief review of these basic ideas. 10
Minimal Knowledge and Minimal Belief The paradigm of minimal knowledge de-
rives from the well-known work of Halpern and Moses, especially [11], later extended
and modified in works such as [30, 27, 28] and others. Many approaches are based
on Kripke-S5-models with a universal accessibility relation and the minimisation of
knowledge is represented by maximising the set of possible worlds with respect to in-
clusion. In general, this has the effect of minimising objective knowledge, ie knowl-
edge of basic facts and propositions. A somewhat different approach was developed by
Schwarz and Truszczynski [18] and can be seen as a special case of the very general
method of Shoham [30] for obtaining different concepts of minimality by changing the
sets of models and preference relations between them. The initial models considered by
[18] (see also [39, 19]) consist of not one (S5) cluster but rather two clusters arranged in
such a way that all worlds in one cluster are accessible from all worlds in the other (but
not vice versa). In Figure 1 clusters are labelled W1,W2, all points are reflexive and
W2
W1first floor
second floor
Fig. 4.
every point in W2 is accessible from every point in W1. We call W1,W2 respectively
the first and the second floor of the model. The former may be empty but the latter not.
10 The authors are grateful to anonymous reviewers whose comments helped to improve the read-
ability of the paper. The second author is grateful to Leo Esakia for discussions on monotonic
wK4f and its connections with topology and also to David Gabelaia due to whom the axiom
f is much more readable. This research has been partially supported by the MCICINN projects
TIN2006-15455, TIN2009-14562-CO5, and CSD2007-00022.
In [18, 19], given a background theory or knowledge set I , minimal knowledge
(with respect to I) is captured by an S5-model of the theory, say M , but now the idea
of minimality is that there should be no two-floor model M ′ as in Figure 1 of the same
theory I , where M coincides with the restriction of M ′ to the second floor W2, and
W1 is smaller in the sense that it fails to verify some objective (non-modal) sentence
true in M . Schwarz and Truszczynski argue that this approach to minimal knowledge
has some important advantages over the method of [11] and they study its properties in
depth, in particular showing that while the two-floor models correspond to the modal
logic S4F first studied by Segerberg [15], minimal knowledge is precisely captured by
non-monotonic S4F . In [19] they show that non-monotonic S4F captures, under some
intuitive encodings, several important approaches to knowledge representation. They
include disjunctive logic programming under answer set semantics [?], (disjunctive)
default logic [23], [25], the logic of grounded knowledge [27], the logic of minimal
belief and negation as failure [28] and the logic of minimal knowledge and belief [19].
Recently, Truszczynski [31] and Cabalar [32] have revived the study of S4F in the
context of a general approach to default reasoning.
Logics via Topology Alfred Tarski [16], together with Chen McKinsey [34, 35], laid
the foundations for the algebraic and topological study of intuitionistic and modal log-
ics. The basic idea, recalled and developed in a recent paper by Leo Esakia [7], is that
from an arbitrary topological space X we can generate three different algebraic struc-
tures each giving rise to different logical systems.11 By considering the algebra of open
sets,Op(X), one is led to the well-known Heyting algebra that forms a semantical basis
for intuitionistic logic. By considering the closure algebra, (P(X), c) one is led to the
modal system S4.12
The third path from topology to logic is via what are known as derivative algebras,
(P(X), der). These are Boolean algebras with a unary operation der representing topo-
logical derivation: if A is a subset of X then der(A) is the set of all accumulation or
limit points of A. The derivative algebra (P (X), der) gives rise to the modal logic
wK4, a slightly weaker version of the logic K4, that was first studied from a topologi-
cal point of view in [4] (see [7] for a detailed overview).
All three paths to logic are of interest for the modelling of agents’ reasoning, their
knowledge and beliefs in AI. Intuitionistic logic and its extensions capture different
forms of constructive reasoning, while extensions of S4, including S5, have formed the
basis for epistemic logics of knowledge. On the other hand, extensions of wK4 may be
considered good candidates for doxastic logics of belief inasmuch as the axiom2p→ p
does not hold. In fact, the standard doxastic logicKD45 is one such extension of wK4.
From the viewpoint of non-monotonic reasoning, there is a special interest in exam-
ining the logics that arise as above from topological spaces X that are minimal, that is
where X has only three open sets. In the first case, we obtain the three-element Heyting
11 For the basic notions of topology see eg [12] or any appropriate textbook.
12 Recall that a Heyting algebra (H,∨,∧,→,⊥) is a distributive lattice with smallest element
⊥ containing a binary operation → such that x ≤ a → b iff a ∧ x ≤ b. (B,∨,∧,−, c) is
a closure algebra if (B,∨,∧,−) is a Boolean algebra and c is a closure operator satisfying:
a ≤ ca, cca = ca, c(a ∨ b) = ca ∨ cb, c⊥ = ⊥.
algebra that captures a logic known as here-and-there, HT , the maximal intermediate
logic that is properly contained in classical logic. The well-known non-monotonic ex-
tension ofHT called equilibrium logic [33] provides a logical foundation for reasoning
with the stable model semantics of logic programs and thus for the popular approach
to knowledge representation and declarative problem solving known as answer set pro-
gramming, ASP. Starting from a minimal topological space and using instead the idea
of closure algebras one arrives at S4F , a reflexive normal modal logic first studied by
Segerberg [15]. We have already observed how non-monotonic S4F relates to minimal
knowledge and is important in knowledge representation and reasoning.
In this paper we study the third path from topology to logic based on minimal topo-
logical spaces. This yields a logic that we call wK4f . Our main motivation is that this
logic (and some close variants) can serve to model minimal belief, in the same way as
S4F captures minimal knowledge. We would like to emphasise again that these ideas
of minimal knowledge and belief are based on properties of models (and what they
verify) and not on the shape of modal axioms. While obtaining a complete axiomatisa-
tion is therefore an important and even essential part of our study, it is not the axioms
themselves that motivate the choice of logic. They provide a compact formulation of a
calculus rather than a direct formalisation of some or other intuitive property of belief.
The connections with minimal belief will be explored in the second half of the paper,
in Section 10, while the first parts of the paper are devoted to the study of wK4f itself.
As we have seen, S4F is captured by Kripke frames consisting of two clusters
connected by an accessibility relation. In the case of wK4f the picture is similar except
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that we drop the condition of reflexivity on frames: in Fig. 2 some points in W1,W2
may now be irreflexive (where i and r label this difference). Since S4F and wK4f are
closely related, many results can be transferred from one to the other.
The paper is organised in the following way. In section 2 we present the syntax and
Kripke semantics of wK4f . We prove completeness and the finite model property. In
section 3 we characterise finite one-step, weakly-transitive frames and their bounded
morphisms in terms of quadruples of natural numbers. In section 4 we prove a main
theorem of the paper, which states that wK4f is the (sound and complete) logic of all
minimal topological spaces. Section 5 describes non-monotonic wK4f and relates it to
the idea of minimal belief. In the last section we state some conclusions and mention
topics for future work.
7 The modal logic wK4f
Following the Tarski/McKinsey suggestion to treat modality as the derivative of the
topological space [34], Esakia in [4, 37] introduced wK4 as the modal logic of all topo-
logical spaces, with the desired (derivative operator) interpretation of the modal ♦.
wK4f is a normal modal logic obtained by adding the axiom weak-F to the modal
logic wK4. wK4f is a weaker logic than S4F discussed in Segerberg [15] since it
doesn’t satisfy the axiom T . However since the frames of wK4f and S4F are closely
related, some results about wK4f may carry over to S4F .
Syntax. The normal modal logic wK4f is defined in a basic modal language with
an infinite set Prop of propositional letters and connectives ∨,∧,¬,2. The axioms are
all classical tautologies plus the axioms listed below. Rules of inference are: modus
ponens, substitution and necessitation.
K : 2(p→ q)→ (2p→ 2q)
w4 : 2p ∧ p→ 22p
f : p ∧ ♦(q ∧2¬p)→ 2(q ∨ ♦q)
Semantics. Kripke semantics for the modal logic wK4f is provided by frames which
have in a weak sense height at most two and which do not allow forking. This is made
precise in the following two definitions.
Definition 1 We will say that a relation R ⊆ W ×W is weakly-transitive if (∀x, y, z)
(xRy ∧ yRz ∧ x 6= z ⇒ xRz).
Clearly every transitive relation is weakly-transitive as well. Moreover, clusters (where
a cluster is a subset of a frame where every two distinct points are related with each
other) with weakly transitive relations differ from those with transitive relations in that
they allow for irreflexive points. Such clusters will be called weak-clusters.
Definition 2 We will say that a relation R ⊆ W × W is a one-step relation if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
1)(∀x, y, z)((xRy ∧ yRz)⇒ (yRx ∨ zRy)),
2)(∀x, y, z)((xRy ∧ ¬(yRx) ∧ xRz ∧ y 6= z)⇒ zRy).
As the reader can see the first condition restricts the ‘strict’ height of the frame
to two. Where informally by ”strict” we mean that the steps are not counted within a
cluster. The second condition is more complicated. Essentially it restricts the ‘strict’
width of the frame to one, though more points could be allowed at the bottom.
We briefly recall some standard definitions in modal logic. The pair (W,R), with
W an arbitrary set and R ⊆ W ×W is called a Kripke frame. If we additionally have
a third component, a function V : Prop ×W → {0, 1}, then we say that we have a
Kripke modelM = (W,R, V ).
For a given Kripke modelM = (W,R, V ) the satisfaction of a formula at a point
w ∈W is defined inductively as follows:M, w  p iff V (p, w) = 1, the Boolean cases
are standard, M, w  2φ iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv ⇒ v  φ). A formula φ is valid in a
modelM if for every point w ∈ W we haveM, w  φ in this case we writeM  φ.
A formula is valid in a frame if it is valid in every model based on the frame. A formula
is valid in a class of frames if it is valid in every frame in the class. Notice that from the
definition of ♦, (♦φ ≡ ¬2¬φ) it easily follows thatM, w  ♦φ iff ∃v ∈W such that
wRv ∧ v  φ.
Let K denote the class of all one-step and weakly-transitive Kripke frames . The
following theorem links the logic wK4f with the class K. The proof uses standard
modal logic completeness techniques, so we will not enter into all the details.
Theorem 3 The modal logic wK4f is sound and strongly complete wrt the class K.
We give the soundness proof only for the axiom f . For the proofs for other axioms the
reader may consult [37].
Proof. Take an arbitrary, weakly-transitive, one-step model (W,R, V ). Assume at some
point w ∈ W it holds that w  p ∧ ♦(q ∧ 2¬p). This implies that w  p and there
exists w′ such that wRw′, w′  q and it is not the case that w′Rw (as far as w′  2¬p).
Now for an arbitrary v with wRv and v 6= w′, by the second condition of definition 2,
we have that vRw′, which implies that v  ♦q and hence w  2(q ∨ ♦q).
For strong completeness assume I 0 φ. We will construct the one-step and weakly-
transitive model M c = {W c, Rc, V c} such that M c  I and M c 1 φ. For M c we take
a standard canonical model ie. W c = {Γ |Γ ` I and Γ is a maximal consistent set}.
The relation is defined in a standard way ΓRcΓ ′ iff (∀α)(2α ∈ Γ ⇒ α ∈ Γ ′) and
V c(p, Γ ) = 1 iff p ∈ Γ .
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma) For any formula φ we have M c, Γ  φ iff φ ∈ Γ .
The proof follows a standard pattern found in modal logic textbooks. As I 0 φ
we have that I ∪ {¬φ} is consistent, so there exists a maximally consistent set Γ¬φ
containing I ∪ {¬φ} and by the truth lemma this means that M c, Γ¬φ  ¬φ which
completes the proof. The main thing to be checked is thatM c ∈ K. For weak transitivity
of the relationRc the reader may consult [37]. Let us show thatRc is a one-step relation.
First let us show thatRc satisfies the first condition of definition 2. For the contradic-
tion assume there exist three distinct points Γ, Γ ′, Γ ′′ ∈W c such that ΓRcΓ ′∧Γ ′RcΓ ′′
and ¬(Γ ′RcΓ )∧¬(Γ ′′RcΓ ′). This means that there is a formula ψ such that 2ψ ∈ Γ ′
and ¬ψ ∈ Γ and there is a formula φ such that 2φ ∈ Γ ′′ and ¬φ ∈ Γ ′ and as Γ ′ 6= Γ ′′
there exists a formula γ with γ ∈ Γ ′ and ¬γ ∈ Γ ′′. From these assumptions we have
that (¬φ∧ γ)∧2¬¬ψ ∈ Γ ′. Now as ΓRcΓ ′ we have that ♦((¬φ∧ γ)∧2¬¬ψ) ∈ Γ
and as ¬ψ ∈ Γ we have that♦((¬φ∧γ)∧2¬¬ψ)∧¬ψ ∈ Γ . Applying axiom f (with
p = ¬ψ, q = ¬φ ∧ γ) we get that 2((¬φ ∧ γ) ∨ ♦(¬φ ∧ γ)) ∈ Γ . Hence as ΓRcΓ ′′
(because of weak transitivity) we have that (¬φ∧ γ)∨♦(¬φ∧ γ) ∈ Γ ′′ . On the other
hand ♦(¬φ ∧ γ) 6∈ Γ ′′ since 2φ ∈ Γ ′′ and ¬φ ∧ γ /∈ Γ ′′ because ¬γ ∈ Γ ′′. Hence we
get a contradiction.
Now let us show that Rc satisfies the second condition of definition 2. Again the
proof is by contradiction. Assume there exist three distinct points Γ, Γ ′, Γ ′′ ∈W c such
that ΓRcΓ ′∧ΓRcΓ ′′∧¬(Γ ′RcΓ ) and ¬(Γ ′′RcΓ ′). This means that there is a formula
ψ such that 2ψ ∈ Γ ′ and ¬ψ ∈ Γ and there is a formula φ such that 2φ ∈ Γ ′′ and
¬φ ∈ Γ ′ and as Γ ′ 6= Γ ′′ there exists a formula γ with γ ∈ Γ ′ and ¬γ ∈ Γ ′′. From
these assumptions we have that (¬φ ∧ γ) ∧ 2¬¬ψ ∈ Γ ′. Now as ΓRcΓ ′ we have that
♦((¬φ∧γ)∧2¬¬ψ) ∈ Γ and as ¬ψ ∈ Γ we have that♦((¬φ∧γ)∧2¬¬ψ)∧¬ψ ∈ Γ .
Applying axiom f we get that2((¬φ∧γ)∨♦(¬φ∧γ)) ∈ Γ . Hence as ΓRcΓ ′′ we have
that (¬φ∧ γ)∨♦(¬φ∧ γ) ∈ Γ ′′ . On the other hand♦(¬φ∧ γ) 6∈ Γ ′′ since 2φ ∈ Γ ′′.
Nor can we have ¬φ ∧ γ ∈ Γ ′′ because ¬γ ∈ Γ ′′. Hence we get a contradiction.
Theorem 5 The modal logic wK4f is sound and complete wrt the class of all finite
one-step and weakly-transitive Kripke frames.
8 Finite, rooted, weakly-transitive and one-step Kripke frames.
We saw from (Theorem 5), which we do not prove in this paper, that the class of finite,
weakly-transitive and one-step Kripke frames fully captures the modal logic wK4f .
From general theorems in modal logic it is well known that this class can be reduced to a
smaller class of frames which are rooted so that the completeness theorem still holds. In
this section we characterise finite, rooted, weakly-transitive and one-step Kripke frames
in terms of quadruples of natural numbers.
Definition 6 The upper cone of a set A ⊆ W in a weakly-transitive Kripke frame
(W,R) is defined as a set R(A) =
⋃{y : x ∈ A&xRy} ∪A.
Observe that the general definition of upper cone in an arbitrary Kripke frame is given in
terms of the reflexive, transitive closure of a relation, while Definition 6 is a simplified
version for the particular case of weakly transitive frames.
Definition 7 A Kripke frame (W,R) is called rooted if there exists a point w ∈W such
that the upper cone R({w}) =W ; w is called the root of the frame.
Let N4 be the set of all quadruples of natural numbers and let N 4 = N4 −
{(n,m, 0, 0)|n,m ∈ N}. The following theorem states that the set Kr of all finite,
rooted, one-step, weakly-transitive frames considered up to isomorphism can be seen
as the set N 4.
Theorem 8 There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set Kr and the set N 4.
Proof. We know that any one-step frame has ”strict” width one and ”strict” height less
than or equal to two (We didn’t give the formal definition of ”strict” height and width,
but it should be clear from the intuitive explanation after the definitions 2 and 1 what
we mean by this). If additionally we have that the frame is rooted, the case where strict
width is greater than one at the bottom is also restricted. It is not difficult to verify that
any such frame (W,R) is of the form (W1,W2), where W1 ∪W2 =W , W1 ∩W2 = ∅
and (∀u ∈ W1,∀v ∈ W2)(uRv). Besides because of the weak-transitivity, we have
that (∀u, u′ ∈ W1)(u 6= u′ ⇒ uRu′) and the same for every two points v, v′ ∈ W2.
Pictorially any rooted, weak-transitive and one-step Kripke frame can be represented
as in Figure 2. Again we call W1 the first floor and W2 the second floor of the frame
(W,R). Notice that W1 or W2 may be equal to ∅ ie the frame has only one floor. In
this case we treat the only floor of the frame as the second floor.
Now let us describe how to construct the function fromKr toN 4. With every frame
(W,R) ∈ N 4 we associate the quadruple (i1, r1, i2, r2), where i1 is the number of
irreflexive points in W1, r1 is the number of reflexive points in W1, i2 is the number
of irreflexive points in W2 and r2 is the number of reflexive points in W2. We will call
the quadruple (i1, r1, i2, r2) the characteriser of the frame (W,R). In case the frame
(W,R) has only one floor, by our earlier remark it is treated as the frame (∅,W ).
Hence its characteriser has the form (0, 0, i, r). Now it is clear that the correspondence
described above defines a function from the set Kr to the set N 4. We denote this func-
tion by Ch.
Claim 1: Ch is injective. Take any two distinct finite, rooted, weakly-transitive, one-
step Kripke frames (W,R) and (W ′, R′). That they are distinct in Kr means that they
are non-isomorphic ie either |W | 6= |W ′| or R 6' R′. In the first case it is immediate
that Ch(W,R) 6= Ch(W ′, R′) since |W | = i1 + i2 + r1 + r2. In the second case we
have three subcases:
1) |W1| 6= |W ′1|. In this subcase i1 + r1 6= i′1 + r′1 and hence Ch(W,R) 6=
Ch(W ′, R′).
2) The number of reflexive (irreflexive) points in |W1| differs from the number of
reflexive (irreflexive) points in |W ′1|. In this subcase i1 6= i′1 and again Ch(W,R) 6=
Ch(W ′, R′).
3) The number of reflexive (irreflexive) points in |W2| differs from the number of
reflexive (irreflexive) points in |W ′2|. This case is analogous to the previous one.
It is straightforward to see that if none of these cases above occur ie |W | = |W ′|,
|W1| = |W ′1|, |{w|w ∈ W1 ∧ wRw}| = |{w′|w′ ∈ W ′1 ∧ w′R′w′}| and |{w|w ∈
W2 ∧ wRw}| = |{w′|w′ ∈ W2 ∧ w′R′w′}| then (W,R) is isomorphic to (W ′R′) and
hence (W,R) = (W ′, R′) in Kr.
Claim 2: Ch is surjective. Take any quadruple (i1, r1, i2, r2) ∈ N 4. Let us show that
the pre-image Ch−1((i1, r1, i2, r2)) is not empty. Take the frame (W,R) = (W1,W2),
where |W1| = i1 + r1, |W2| = i2 + r2, W1 contains i1 irreflexive and r1 reflexive
points and |W2| contains i2 irreflexive and r2 reflexive points. Then by the definition of
Ch, we have that Ch(W,R) = (i1, r1, i2, r2).
9 Connection with minimal topological spaces
In this section we show that wK4f is the modal logic of minimal topological spaces. A
topological space is minimal if it has only three open sets. It is well known that there is
a bijection between Alexandrof spaces and weakly-transitive, irreflexive Kripke frames
and this bijection preserves modal formulas. In this section we show that the special
case of this correspondence for minimal topological spaces gives one-step, irreflexive
and weakly-transitive relations as a counterpart. As a corollary it follows that the logic
wK4f is sound and complete wrt the class of minimal topological spaces.
Theorem 9 There is a one-to-one correspondence between the class of all irreflexive,
weakly-transitive, finite, rooted, one-step Kripke frames and the class of all finite mini-
mal topological spaces.
Proof. Assume (W,R) is a finite, rooted, irreflexive, weakly-transitive and one-step
relational structure. (Note that as the frame is irreflexive its characteriser has the form
(i1, 0, i2, 0), where i1+ i2 = |W |.) Let W1 be the first floor and W2 the second floor of
the frame, then the topology we construct is {W,∅,W2}. It is immediate that the space
(W,ΩR), where ΩR = {W,∅,W2}, is a minimal topological space.
Let us show that the correspondence we described is injective. Take two arbitrary
distinct irreflexive, finite, rooted, weakly-transitive frames (W,R) and (W ′, R′). As
they are distinct, either W 6= W ′ or R 6= R′. In the first case it is immediate that
(W,ΩR) 6= (W ′, ΩR′). In the second case as both R and R′ are irreflexive the second
floors are not the same, so W2 6=W ′2 and hence ΩR 6= ΩR′ .
For surjectivity take an arbitrary minimal topological space (W,Ω), where Ω =
{W,∅,W0} for some subset W0 ⊆ W . Take the frame (W,R), where R = (W0 ×
W0 − {(w,w)|w ∈ W0}) ∪ (−W0 × −W0 − {(w,w)|w ∈ −W0}) ∪ {(w,w′)|w ∈
−W0, w′ ∈ W0}. In words every two distinct points are related in W0 by R and the
same in the complement −W0 = W − W0, besides every point from the −W0 is
related to every point from W0. What we get is the rooted one-step relation which is
weakly-transitive, with the second floor equal to W0. As we didn’t allow wRw for any
point w ∈W , the relation R is also irreflexive.
We now give the definition of a derived set (or set of accumulation points) of a set in a
topological space. This definition is needed to give the derived set semantics of modal
formulas in an arbitrary topological space.
Definition 10 Given a topological space (W,Ω) and a set A ⊆ W we will say that
w ∈W is an accumulation point of A if for every neighborhood Uw of w the following
holds: Uw ∩A− {w} 6= ∅. The set of all accumulation points of A will be denoted by
der(A) and will be called the derived set of A.
Below we give the definition of satisfaction of modal formulas.
Definition 11 A topological model (W,Ω, V ) is a triple, where (W,Ω) is a topological
space and V : Prop→ P (W ) is a valuation function. Satisfaction of a modal formula
in a topological model (W,Ω, V ) at a point w ∈W is defined by:
w  p iff w ∈ V (p) ; w  ♦p iff w ∈ der(V (p)),
Boolean cases are standard. Validity of a formula in a topological space and class of
topological spaces is defined in a standard way
Fact 12 Let (W,R) be a finite, weakly-transitive and irreflexive frame and let (W,ΩR)
be its Alexandrof space. For every modal formula α the following holds:
(W,R)  α iff (W,ΩR)  α.
Note that here  on the left hand side denotes the validity in Kripke frames while on the
right hand side it denotes the validity in topological frames in derived set semantics.
Theorem 13 The modal logic wK4f is sound and complete with respect to the class
of all minimal topological spaces.
Proof. Soundness can be checked directly so we do not prove it here. For complete-
ness assume 0 φ. By theorem 5 there exists a finite, one-step, weakly-transitive frame
(W,R) which falsifies φ. Assume that Ch(W,R) = (i1, r1, i2, r2). It is not difficult to
check that (W,R) is a p-morphic image of (W ′, R′), where (W ′, R′) = Ch−1(i1+2×
r1, 0, i2+2×r2, 0). Roughly speaking the main idea here is that two distinct irreflexive
points from first floor (second floor) of (W ′, R′) are mapped to one reflexive point of
first floor (second floor) of (W,R). So each reflexive point in (W,R) has two irreflexive
preimages and each irreflexive point in (W,R) has one irreflexive point as a preimage.
Now as you can see on each floor in (W ′, R′) there are enough irreflexive points to
cover both reflexive and irreflexive point of the corresponding floor in (W,R). So we
have a surjection. To check that the described function satisfies back and forth condi-
tions of the p-morphism is left to the reader. The surjection implies that (W ′, R′) 1 φ.
Now as far as (W ′, R′) is irreflexive, the result immediately follows from theorem 9,
and the fact 12.
10 Minimal Belief and Non-Monotonic wK4f
It is often held that KD45 represents an adequate logic for belief. One motivation for
this is that it allows positive and negative introspection and additionally 2p→ p is not
derivable in the logic. A Kripke model M for KD45 consists of cluster W plus one
irreflexive point w so that w is related to every point in W but no point in W is related
to w. In other words the first floor ofM is one irreflexive point and the second floor is
a cluster. The belief set of an agent is obtained as a theory of the second floor. Indeed
ϕ ∈ Th(W ) iff M  2ϕ. 13 In particular minimisation is relative to some base set
I of beliefs. The aim is to capture a set which contains I , is closed under positive and
negative introspection, is closed under logical deduction and does not contain anything
superfluous. One way to obtain such a set is to consider aKD45 Kripke modelM such
that v  I for every v ∈W and extend the clusterW by adding points which still make
I true. As a result the set of objective facts true in every world will be reduced while the
starting beliefs I will stay unchanged. This approach is applied in [11] to knowledge
sets, but as discussed in [19] it has some unintuitive consequences. For this reason we
follow the pattern of [19] which relies on the idea that an agent’s belief is dependent
not only on the objective facts but also on the things that are believed by agent. More
concretely we minimise the belief set by adding worlds on the first floor of the modelM
leaving the second floor untouched. This form of minimal model semantics provides an
alternative way of minimising belief and I-expansions for wK4f are exactly minimal
belief sets. This is the chief motivation for considering non-monotonic wK4f to be a
good candidate for the logic of minimal belief.
Formally we want to relate non-monotonic wK4f to the idea of minimal model in-
troduced and characterised in [39]. However we cannot directly apply the general result
(Theorem 3.1) of [39] since that theorem refers to what are called cluster-closed logics.
Instead we can adapt Schwarz’s techniques to our case, starting with the definition of
preferred model for a class K. The preference relation is between one-floor S5-models
13 Recall that the idea of minimisation applies to the belief set of an agent.
and two-floor models and only two-floor models can be preferred over S5-models. For
example we can not compare two one-floor models with each other.
Definition 14 We say that a two-floor model N = (N,S, U) is preferred over S5-
modelM = (W,R, V ) if:
a) There is a propositional formula ψ such thatM  ψ and N 1 ψ,
b) (W,R) is the second floor of (N,S) and V equals to the restriction of U to the
second floor. Briefly,M is the model which is obtained by deleting the first floor in N .
We next define the notion of minimal model that is central for the semantics of non-
monotonic modal logics.
Definition 15 An S5-modelM = (W,R, V ) is called a K-minimal model for the set
of formulas I ifM  I and for every preferred model N ∈ K we have N 1 I .
Non-monotonic wK4f does not fit the scope of Theorem 3.1 [39] because the class
K which characterises monotonic wK4f is not cluster closed. In particular some two-
floor models inKmay not have a cluster as a maximum. On the other hand every model
in K has a maximal weak-cluster (that is a cluster where irreflexive points are allowed
or more precisely it is a rooted, symmetric, weakly-transitive frame). For this reason we
need to consider weak-cluster closed classes.
Definition 16 LetN = (N,S, U) be a Kripke model. A nonempty setW ⊆ N is called
a final weak-cluster if:
a)W is an upper cone (def. 6),
b)W is weak-cluster,
c) For every v ∈ N −W and for every w ∈W , vRw.
It is immediate from Definition 16 and from Theorem 8 that every rooted, weakly-
transitive, one-step frame has a final weak-cluster and it is the second floor (or the only
floor) of the frame.
Definition 17 Let N = (N,S, U) be a Kripke model and let N2 be its final weak-
cluster. LetM = (W,R, V ) be a cluster. By cluster substitution ofM in N we mean
the model < (N −N2) ∪W,S′, V ′ >, where for each w, v ∈ (N −N2) ∪W,wS′v if
and only if wSv or v ∈ W and V ′ agrees with U on (N −N2) and agrees with V on
W . In other words we substitute the cluster W instead of the weak-cluster N2 into N .
Definition 18 By the concatenation of two models (W,R, V ) and (N,S, U) with W ∩
N = ∅ we mean the model (N ∪W,S ∪N ×W ∪R,U ∪ V ).
Definition 19 Let C be a class of models. We say that C is weak-cluster closed if C
contains all weak-clusters and for each N ∈ C, at least one of the following two
conditions holds: the concatenation of N and each cluster belongs to C, or N has
a final weak-cluster and for each S5-model M, the cluster substitution of M in N
belongs to C.
It is immediate that K is weak-cluster closed. As usual, non-monotonic modal logics
are defined via the notion of expansion.
Definition 20 Let L be a modal logic. A set of formulas T is said to be an L-expansion
of a set of formulas I if T = CnL(I ∪ {¬2ϕ : ϕ 6∈ T}).
where CnL denotes consequence in L. Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of
this section.
Theorem 21 LetM = (W,R, V ) be an S5-model, and T = {φ|M  φ}. Then T is
an wK4f -expansion of I if and only ifM is a K-minimal model of I .
Proof. Assume T is awK4f -expansion for I . This means that T = CnL[I∪{¬2φ|φ 6∈
T}], where L stands for wK4f . For the contradiction assumeM is not minimal. This
means that there is a wK4f -model N = (N,S, U) such that N is preferred overM
and N  I . That N is preferred overM means that there is a propositional formula
α such thatM  α while N 1 α. Now take an arbitrary formula ψ 6∈ T . Since T is
an expansion we have that ♦¬ψ ∈ T hence M  ♦¬ψ. Hence there is at least one
point w ∈ W with w  ¬ψ and hence for every point y in the first floor of N we have
y  ♦¬ψ which yields that N  ♦¬ψ. So we get that N  I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈ T} and
hence N  T which is a contradiction since α ∈ T .
For the other direction assume M is K-minimal for I . That CnL[I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈
T}] ⊆ T follows directly from the fact thatM  I and ifM 1 ψ then there exists at
least one point w ∈W with w  ¬ψ and since R is a universal relation,M  ♦¬ψ.
For the other inclusion we show that for every rooted weakly-transitive and one-step
model N = (N,S, U) the following holds:
(∗) N  CnL[I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈ T}]⇒ N  T.
This by Theorem 3 will imply that CnL[I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈ T}] ` T in wK4f and, as the
left side is closed under consequence, we get that T ⊆ CnL[I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈ T}]. Now
let us prove the star.
Assume N  CnL[I ∪ {¬2φ|φ 6∈ T}]. Note that N cannot have one irreflexive
point as a maximum. This would implyCh(N,S) = (i1, r1, 1, 0), see Theorem 8. Then
the irreflexive point does not satisfy ¬2⊥, hence ⊥ ∈ T , which is a contradiction as
far a T is the theory ofM.
Let us denote the floors of N by N1 and N2 respectively. In case N is a one-
floor frame, N2 = ∅. Since K is weak-cluster closed, there is N ∗ ∈ K which is
either the concatenation of N andM or is a cluster substitution ofM in N . We prove
by induction on the complexity of a formula that for every point w ∈ N1, we have
N ∗, w  φ iff N , w  φ. The only non-trivial case is for formulas of the form 2φ.
Assume N , w  2φ, then φ ∈ T . This means that M  φ. Now for every point
w′ ∈ N1 such that wSw′ we have N , w′  φ and hence by the inductive assumption
we get that N ∗, w′  φ. So N ∗, w  2φ.
Conversely assume for some point w ∈ N1 we have N ∗, w  2φ. By the same
argument as in the previous case, for every point v ∈ N1 such thatwSv,N , v  φ. Now
if N ∗ is a concatenation of N andM then N = N1, and hence we have N , w  2φ.
In case N ∗ is cluster substitution we additionally need to show that for every point
v ∈ N2, N , v  φ. From N ∗, w  2φ we have thatM  φ and henceM  2φ. This
implies that ¬2φ 6∈ T and hence N  ♦2φ. It is not hard to check that this implies
that for every point v ∈ N2 we have N , v  φ. The main point here is that N cannot
have one-irreflexive point as a maximum. Now as N  I , we have that N ∗  I , hence
N ∗ is not preferred overM which implies that N ∗  T . Hence N  T .
This yields the promised link between wK4f and minimal models in the style of [18,
19]; so non-monotonic wK4f may be a promising first step in the search for logics of
minimal belief.
11 Conclusions
Following Tarski and McKinsey there are three natural paths from topology to algebraic
semantics for logics. The third path involves derivative algebras and has been explored
in particular by Leo Esakia [4, 37, 7] and the Tbilisi group in logic. The first two paths
give rise to logics extending intuitionistic logic and to modal S4, respectively. In these
cases the logics obtained from minimal topological spaces have proved to be highly
relevant in AI, for non-monotonic reasoning, logic programming and epistemic logic
based on the idea of minimal knowledge. From this point of view, the third path to logics
from minimal topological spaces has not previously been investigated. It gives rise to
the logic wK4f introduced and characterised in this paper that seems a good starting
point for studying the idea of minimal belief, analogous to the minimal knowledge
approach of [18, 19] based on S4F .
We conclude by mentioning briefly how these two logics, hence their corresponding
epistemic concepts, can be formally related. There are well-known embedding relations
holding between intuitionistic logic H and S4 and between S4 and wK4. It can be
shown that these relations extend to those logics based on minimal topological spaces.
In fact we get the following picture
nonmonotonic EL
G // S4F ∗
Sp // wK4f∗
min− topologies HT
OO
G // S4F
OO
Sp // wK4f
OO
topologies H
OO
G // S4
OO
Sp // wK4
OO
Here HT is again the logic of here-and-there, G is the well-known Go¨del translation
and Sp is known as the splitting translation from modal formulas to modal formulas
such that in particular for an atom p, Sp(♦p) = p∨♦p, Sp(2p) = p∧2p (see eg [7]).
Then in particular S4F ` ϕ iff wK4f ` Sp(ϕ). In other words, we obtain the natural
interpretation of knowledge as truth together with belief. We plan to elaborate on this
in future work and to study how to extend this picture to include the non-monotonic
versions of each of the logics at the top of the diagram. Another future topic is to study
of the exact relations between non-monotonic wK4f and autoepistemic logic as well
as non-monotonic S4F .
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